NOTES
More Money, More Problems: How Oklahoma’s Novel
Approach to Ponzi Scheme Clawbacks in Oklahoma
Department of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Blair Means
More Uncertainty for Investors
I. Introduction
I believe Marsha’s gotten maybe an eight or a ten year [jail]
sentence out of this . . . my wife and myself have gotten life
sentences out of this.1
By the time Bernard Madoff’s headline-grabbing Ponzi scheme (one of the
largest ever discovered2) came crumbling down in late 2008,3 certain
investors of Oklahoman Marsha Schubert had already experienced first-hand
the legal and personal repercussions of such a fraudulent endeavor.4 While
the monetary impacts of Schubert’s and Madoff’s respective schemes differ
dramatically,5 both instances prompt real questions about the current abilities
1. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker (OETA television broadcast Sept. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.investedok.org/documentaries/Anatomy-RogueBroker_ 1000.asp. Ponzi
schemer Marsha Schubert pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in Oklahoma federal court and
received a ten-year sentence. Jay F. Marks, Former Investment Adviser Sentenced to 10 Years for
Fraud, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.newsok.com/article/2910915?
searched=marsha%20schubert%20 10%20years%20federal%20prison&custom_click=search.
2. Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2008,
6:45 PM ET), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_1212croes
us_inl.html.
3. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for
Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-293.htm.
4. Temporary Restraining Order, Order Appointing Receiver, Order Freezing Assets
and Order for Accounting at 1, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Schubert, No. CJ-2004256 (Logan Cnty. Ct. Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.securities.ok.gov/ Enforce
ment/Orders/OrderInLineDisplay.asp?LinkAddress=TRO_SchubertAssociates_CJ-04256.pdf& FileNo=05-031.
5. Currently, claims by Madoff to the Securities Investor Protection Corp. amount to
$57.2 billion. Bob Van Voris, Phil Mattingly & Patricia Hurtado, SIPC Tells Congress
$57.2 Billion Madoff Victims Claims Exceed Its Funds, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2010, 11:01
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-24/madoff-victim-claims-exceed-availablesipc-funds-letter-shows.html. The current clawback efforts in the Madoff case may even
force certain owners of the New York Mets to consider selling some of their stake in the
team to settle the clawback claim against them. Alison Leigh Cowan & Richard Sandomir,
Madoff Profits Fueled Mets’ Empire, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, available at
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of courts and regulators to handle the aftermath of the fraudulent endeavor
known as the Ponzi scheme. The major controversy arises when attempting
to reconcile the fact that some innocent investors lose up to their entire initial
investment while others actually “profit” with returns on their investment
capital (or at least believe such is the case while the scheme is still viable). In
the end, investors who lost their investments are left wondering what relief is
available to them, people involved with the perpetration of the fraud face
civil and criminal charges,6 and a different class of investors that actually
made a return on their initial investment are confronted with the possibility of
receivers or Bankruptcy trustees of the Ponzi-schemer’s estate “clawing
back” those profits as part of a plan to repay creditors.
An important and currently unresolved question asks: should winning
investors who received a “profit” from a fraudulent Ponzi scheme be able to
retain those funds disguised as earnings? Many courts accept the proposition
that individuals who were fortunate to be winning investors in the Ponzi
scheme should not be permitted to “enjoy an advantage over later investors
sucked into the Ponzi scheme who were not so lucky.”7 But what if those
investors had no knowledge of the scheme and simply sought out a risky
investment, not a fraudulent one? In equitable terms, when the house of
cards comes crumbling down, some may allege that the winning investors are
unjustly enriched at the cost of losing investors.
As Madoff’s victims continue to challenge the proposed plans to
“clawback” their profits to repay a fraction of what the losing investors
(those who never saw the return of their investment and/or a profit) lost,
state courts are similarly faced with the need to navigate the same murky
waters of fairness vis-à-vis fraudulent funds.8 In early 2010, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court implemented an original approach regarding the limited
equitable relief to which losing investors and other creditors of such a

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/sports/baseball/05mets.html?_r=1&hp. In the Schubert
case, the allegations maintained that eighty-seven people lost more than nine million dollars
while more than 150 people “made” about six million dollars in the scheme. See Okla.
Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010).
6. “An overlap between civil and criminal law is apparent in examining cases
involving securities fraud. An individual violating securities statutes can be subject to civil
and administrative proceedings, criminal prosecution, or dual civil and criminal actions.”
ELLEN S. PODGER & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL 78 (4th ed.
2009).
7. In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 1991).
8. See infra Part III.B.
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scheme are entitled when it decided Oklahoma Department of Securities ex
rel. Faught v. Blair.9
In this case of first impression, the court established that a receiver or the
Department of Securities “may proceed against the innocent investors to
recover unreasonable profits received in excess of their investments in the
Ponzi scheme”10 under an unjust enrichment theory.11 The issue after Blair,
then, is if particular profits are not deemed unreasonable, will certain lucky
winning investors be allowed to keep the tainted funds distributed to them as
profit? In the court’s quest to find the most equitable way to try to make
defrauded investors whole, the Oklahoma decision may simply insert more
gray into an already cloudy area.
This note examines the current controversies regarding Ponzi scheme
clawbacks and the potential lack of equitable remedies under Oklahoma’s
latest judicial holding to make losing investors whole. Given the ambiguity
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision, any attempt to restore losing
investors will be unpredictable and perhaps unmanageable. Part II of this
note provides a brief history of Ponzi schemes and the consequences when
they inevitably fail. Part III presents an overview of applicable law before
the Oklahoma case and guiding trends from other states and federal
decisions. Part IV discusses the facts, central issues, and ultimate holding in
Oklahoma Department of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Blair.12 Part V
examines potential downstream effects stemming from the decision and
presents questions of application. Also considered is the potential impact of
the holding on the established pro rata scheme of distribution and the
suggestions of legislators to provide Ponzi-specific legislation to help
alleviate the particularly controversial area of clawbacks. Together these
elements suggest that Oklahoma has implemented a standard of recovery that
may create more potential problems than it solves. This note briefly
concludes in Part VI.

9. 231 P.3d 645 (Okla. 2010).
10. Id. at 649.
11. Id. at 663. The other elements of the case—namely the role of the Oklahoma
Department of Securities/receiver—are beyond the scope of this note.
12. 231 P.3d 645.
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II. Ponzi Scheme Basics: Money, Lies, and Eventual Downfall
Without exception, the returns promised by Ponzi schemes are too
good to be true.13
The following section highlights the basics of a Ponzi scheme as well as
the major pieces and players involved in the scheme. Roles within the
scheme take on primary importance once the scheme collapses.
The term Ponzi scheme itself comes from the failed, fraudulent enterprise
of Charles Ponzi during the 1920s.14 Technically, the endeavor is defined as:
[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by
later investors generates artificially high dividends or returns for
the original investors, whose example attracts even larger
investments. Money from the new investors is used directly to
repay or pay interest to earlier investors, [usually] without any
operation or revenue-producing activity other than the continual
raising of new funds.15
The object of the scam may differ, but many (like the scheme run by
Marsha Schubert) focus on the sale and trading of securities.16 A scheme
may begin as a legitimate enterprise and morph into a Ponzi scheme. Others
(like Schubert’s) are “classic” schemes where an initial lie becomes the

13. David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi Schemes, 34
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 217 (2010).
14. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
16. The Securities Act of 1933 broadly defines a security as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security feature, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
“security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). This definition is the same in Oklahoma. See 71 OKLA. STAT.
§ 1-102 (2011). See also Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650
(Okla. 2010).
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foundation for an entire web of deception.17 Regardless of the beginning of
the scheme, two classes of investors will exist when the enterprise fails:
winning investors and losing investors. The winning investors are those who
“profited” from the scheme by recovering their initial investment and
receiving a “profitable” return on that investment. It is important to keep in
mind that when dealing with a pure Ponzi scheme, there technically are no
profits; newer investors’ money is simply disguised and reshuffled as profit
as there is usually no real underlying business venture.18 Also, the very
nature (and initial appeal) of a Ponzi scheme is to promise investors an
inflated rate of return on their initial investment.19 For example, Marsha
Schubert promised her investors returns of 30%.20 Conversely, the losing
investors are those who lost some or all of their principal investment without
the promised returns.21 Often these downstream investors simply lose
because of timing as they entered the scheme too close to its collapse to
“earn” a return on their investment or any type of profit.22
The entire scheme, built by illusion upon illusion, will eventually fail. The
exact cause of the failure may be attributed to events like the detection of the
scheme by state or federal securities officials23 or the fact that not enough
new funds from investors are flowing in to keep the scam afloat, often
because of a market downturn.24 Once triggered, the downfall of the scheme
follows distinct routes based on the particular set of facts of the case. An
option in any route is the instigation of clawback claims as a means to make
defrauded investors and creditors whole. Where circumstances allow, the
remaining estate may become a debtor under the terms of the Bankruptcy
Code (that is, the trustee will be charged with paying losing investors and
17. See Plaintiff’s Petition at 11, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Farmers &
Merchs. Bank, No. CJ-2006-3311 (Okla. Cnty. Ct. Apr. 21, 2006).
18. See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 158 (1998) (quoting Martino v. Edison
Worldwide Capital, 189 B.R. 425, 437 n.17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)).
19. See id. (quoting Martino, 189 B.R. at 437 n.17).
20. Marks, supra note 1.
21. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures
in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368,
395 (2009).
22. See Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 13, at 208-09.
23. See, e.g., Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010)
(highlighting that the Schubert Ponzi scheme was discovered by the Oklahoma Department
of Securities who then commenced action in district court for injunctive relief and the
appointment of a receiver for Schubert and Associates).
24. Tom Lauricella, Aaron Lucchett & Amir Efrat, Madoff Ran Vast Options Game,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, at A19.
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creditors of the estate).25 The trustee will be able to incorporate the tools
provided to it through the jurisdiction’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(herein UFTA) to attempt to reclaim some of the transferred funds.26
Alternatively, under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee can seek
to recover not only the profits of the Ponzi scheme but also a winning
investor’s principal as a preference.27
In cases outside of the bankruptcy context, the investors in the scheme
may bring individual suits under applicable state law or “petition a state court
for appointment of a receiver to liquidate the operator’s assets.”28 In the case
that is the subject of this note, for example, the Oklahoma Department of
Securities investigated the enterprise of Marsha Schubert after receiving an
anonymous tip and, after uncovering evidence of the Ponzi scheme,29
initiated action and moved forward with securing the appointment of a
receiver.30 This process is similar at the federal level.31
Next, the administrators of a state-based or federal securities32 action or a
court-appointed receiver will be able to look to a particular jurisdiction’s
UFTA to proceed against the winning investors through either a constructive
or actual fraud approach.33
Currently, forty-three states (including
34
Oklahoma ) and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA.35 Under
25. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 158. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548, where the trustee
can look to a jurisdiction’s UFTA, the general maxim remains that
[i]nvestors are never able to keep the profits distributed by the Ponzi
scheme . . . the “profits” that are credited to the investor are nonexistent, as
they arise not from an underlying business venture but instead from outright
theft. To use a common maxim, if a Ponzi scheme robs Peter to pay Paul, Paul
is not entitled to his misbegotten profits.
James Butler Cash Jr., When Is an Equity Participant Actually a Creditor? The Effects of In
Re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme Victims and the Good Faith Defense, 98 KY. L.J. 329, 336
(2010).
26. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 160.
27. See id. at 181.
28. Id. at 158 n.8.
29. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1.
30. Temporary Restraining Order, Order Appointing Receiver, Order Freezing Assets
and Order for Accounting, supra note 4, at 1.
31. See Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 13, at 94.
32. Under federal securities law there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over equitable
suits and an action at law when the suit is brought to enforce a liability or duty established
by federal securities law. See Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 15
§ U.S.C. 77v(a), 78aa (2006)).
33. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 160.
34. Oklahoma’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act can be found at 24 OKLA. STAT. §
116 (2011).
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such approach, the general maxim remains that a payment as profit above the
initial investment is avoidable as a fraudulent transfer as “the money used for
the underlying investments came from investors taken in by fraudulent
representations.”36
While it may seem “fair” for a winning investor in a UFTA Ponzi
clawback to keep those profits seemingly made with his or her own money, at
least when considering the situation solely as between the investor and the
operator of the scheme, such a viewpoint “is not true as between him and
either the creditors of or the other investors in the company.”37 After the
scheme collapses, the Ponzi schemer himself does not retain the bulk of the
funds. Instead the money obtained from the scam has already been
redistributed to other investors (or spent by the schemer himself), a fact that
makes a Ponzi scheme clawback effort remarkably problematic.
Significantly, using either approach regarding clawbacks available under
the UFTA (and also through a jurisdiction’s UFTA availability to bankruptcy
proceedings), the investor will at least be divested of his or her fraudulent
profit in a successful claim by a trustee or receiver.38 Under a constructive
fraud approach, the trustee can proceed with recovery of the “fictitious profits
earned by the investor,”39 while under an actual fraud claim the trustee can
attempt to recover both the fictitious profits and the return upon the investor’s
initial investment.40
As Blair demonstrates, however, there is a third avenue of action available
through equity-based claims such as unjust enrichment.41 The cases
discussed later in this note on the outcomes of such equity claims after the
downfall of a Ponzi scheme reflect mixed results in terms of successful
clawbacks, creating uncertainty for the various parties involved.
Nonetheless, Blair highlights the specific goal of a receiver: to “marshal
and untangle a company’s assets without being forced into court by every
35. Legislative Fact Sheet - Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title+Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act (last
visited May 25, 2012). Many of those jurisdictions that have not adopted the UFTA have
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 160.
The distinctions among the UFTA, UFCA, and § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code are few; one
of the main distinctions rests with their statutes of limitations. Id. at 160 n.15.
36. Jeff Sonn, Ponzi Schemes – Picking Up the Pieces from a Fallen House of Cards,
1755 PLI/CORP 443, 466 (Aug. 2009).
37. Id.
38. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 397.
39. McDermott, supra note 18, at 160.
40. Id. at 173.
41. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 651 (Okla. 2010).
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investor or claimant.”42 A receivership provides a “procedural vehicle to
protect the underlying equitable rights . . . to funds that have been grossly
mismanaged and dissipated by fraud.”43 The strength of the receivership
rests in the accommodating procedural rules which provide effective
protection of the equitable substantive rights at risk.44 For all practical
purposes, the receiver steps into the shoes of the now-defunct enterprise and
handles payments to investors and creditors (including the losing Ponzi
scheme investors).
In actuality, the ability of a receiver or trustee to reclaim funds is never
simple, primarily due to the fact that most collapsed schemes have few
physical or liquid assets remaining.45 Instead the failed scheme’s largest
assets are usually the claims the estate has against the winning investors.46
Hence, the trustee’s or receiver’s challenge is to sue those winning investors
under the Bankruptcy Code or UFTA provisions, or to look to an equitable
theory and, in the end, redistribute the funds to losing investors of the scheme
and to other creditors.47
Such an action against a winning investor has been deemed a “clawback”
in today’s financial and legal vocabulary. “Clawing back” encompasses the
method for recouping losses under specific circumstances where inherent
unfairness should not be allowed to stand.48 From the point of view of losing
Ponzi scheme investors, clawbacks provide a real opportunity to see the
return of some of their investment capital. Put succinctly, “clawbacks
function to bridge the gap in remedies under prevailing law for addressing
unfair enrichment.”49 The endgame for the receivers or trustees revolves
around a goal of making creditors, including losing investors, whole—a
difficult mission to accomplish in an inherently unfair situation. Ultimately,
the underlying policy focuses on the amount of relief that can be provided as

42. Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 13, at 203 (quoting United States v. Acorn Tech.
Fund, 429 F.2d 438, 443 (3rd Cir. 2005)).
43. Blair, 231 P.3d at 665; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1554 (2011) (explaining that
“[t]he receiver has, under the control of the court, power to bring and defend actions in his
own name, as receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, to
collect debts, to compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and generally to
do such acts respecting the property as the courts may authorize”).
44. See Blair, 231 P.3d at 665.
45. McDermott, supra note 18, at 158.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 158-59.
48. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 410-11.
49. Id. at 414.
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the receivers redistribute the funds “in either an attempt to make defrauded
parties whole or to prevent unjust enrichment.”50
III. Law Before the Case: The Varying Approaches to Ponzi Scheme
Clawback Litigation
The relative lack of specific case law in Oklahoma dealing with Ponzi
schemes, the claim of unjust enrichment within such a context, and the issue
of the extent to which a receiver may pursue a winning investor require the
court to look beyond the border of the state for guidance and existing (albeit
non-binding) precedent.
The issues are numerous.
First, standing
requirements must be met before a clawback claim can commence. In
Oklahoma, these requirements are satisfied by both statute and accepted
principles of equity.51 Next, while the Tenth Circuit has declined to allow a
receiver to clawback a winning investor’s profits through a theory of unjust
enrichment,52 there is no consensus among the courts in general as to this
issue and even less discussion as to any qualification of the amount that can
be pursued by the receiver. Finally, Oklahoma’s implementation of new
standards in this context must be reconciled with previous state case law and
broader policies accepting a pro rata scheme of distribution resulting from a
receivership.
Central for the discussion here, ultimately, is the fact that no other state
court has imposed a reasonable or unreasonable standard of the actual amount
of recovery in an unjust enrichment-based clawback effort. Before Blair,
cases involving such a claim fell into one of two camps: either the funds
transferred to winning investors as profit above their principal were
considered to have unjustly enriched winning investors or not.53 A broad
categorization of the applicable statutory provisions—be it through the
Bankruptcy Code54 or UFTA—shows a similarly streamlined approach:
the courts that have adjudicated the rights of trustees and Ponzi
investors have appropriately refused to allow investors to retain
any profit . . . To analyze the entire set of transfers to an investor,
50. Spencer C. Barash & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback”
Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922, 922 (2009) (emphasis added).
51. See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 661-65 (Okla. 2010).
52. See Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d, 833 F.2d
908 (10th Cir. 1987).
53. See infra Part III.B
54. “[B]ankruptcy courts can, at a minimum, require the return of any profits [investors]
received from the investment.” Cash Jr., supra note 25, at 330.
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rather than focusing on the profit component, incorrectly assumes
that there is something of value in a Ponzi scheme when in fact the
whole series of transactions has been a sham.55
A. Ability to Bring Equitable Relief Claims Against Winning Ponzi Investors
Although the federal government often handles security offerings, the
states still maintain an important position in many areas of securities
regulation.56 State laws concerning the fraudulent transfers of securities may
still have considerable impact.57 Not only are there securities violations from
a Ponzi scheme itself, there are subsequent civil and/or criminal claims that
result against the schemer himself and, downstream, against winning
investors. Blair results from such litigation. In Blair, the court relied upon
statutorily defined roles of the Oklahoma Department of Securities and the
flexibility inherent in a receivership to clawback the funds in question
through a theory of unjust enrichment.58
The controversies and ultimate decision to allow the Department of
Securities to pursue clawback litigation contain elements worthy of their own
study, extending beyond the scope of this note. However, the underlying
equitable theme which the court relied upon built a foundation for the
ultimate decision that is the focus of this note.
The Oklahoma Department of Securities is created and governed by
statute.59 Provisions of the Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act of 2004 grant
powers to the Department of Securities as a government entity. Critical for
this discussion are the civil enforcement powers under 71 Okla. Stat. § 1-603.
Subsection A of the statute directs the administration to “maintain an action”
in the Oklahoma court system if the Department administrator believes a
person is engaging in acts or practices that would violate the Securities Act.60
Subsection B allows the administrator to take certain enforcement measures,
including the ability to “[o]rder such other relief as the court considers
appropriate.”61
55. McDermott, supra note 18, at 168.
56. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 305 (Thompson/West
6th ed. 2009).
57. See id. at 306.
58. See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 661-65 (Okla. 2010).
59. See 71 OKLA. STAT. § 1-601 (2011).
60. Id. § 1-603(A). Specific provisions of the Act applicable to a Ponzi-schemer
include: offering or selling a security in an act or practice that “would operate as fraud or
deceit upon another person.” Id. § 1-501(3). Also, advising with untrue statements of
material facts involved concerning the security offerings. See id. § 1-502(A)(2).
61. Id. § 1-603(B)(3) (emphasis added).
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In State ex rel. Day v. Southwest Mineral Energy, Inc.,62 for example, the
Department of Securities brought suit alleging the defendants had offered and
sold interests in oil and gas wells without proper securities registration,
grossly overvalued their drilling costs, and questionably transferred funds to a
corporate account.63 The Department of Securities administrator, in addition
to seeking specific injunctions, sought disgorgement (defined as “a
mandatory order by the [c]ourt requiring those who obtain funds from
investors or purchasers or lessees in violation of regulatory provisions, to
‘disgorge’ themselves of the illegally obtained profits”64) through powers
established in the Oklahoma Securities Act.65 Looking to similar decisions at
the federal level66 (a recurring practice in the effort to harmonize state and
federal securities regulation), the court cited the United States Supreme Court
in explaining, “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full
scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.”67
In Oklahoma the distinction between courts of equity and of law has been
abolished68 and the district courts enjoy unlimited original jurisdiction.69
These facts subsequently led the court to declare “[o]nce the equity
jurisdiction of the District Court has properly been invoked, the Court
possesses the necessary power to fashion appropriate remedies . . . [this]
includes the power to require ‘disgorgement’ of unlawful profits in
appropriate cases.”70 While this case provides precedent for equitable actions
charged by the Department of Securities, it does little to assuage the overriding fairness concerns within the context of a Ponzi scheme as to whom
should ultimately have to pay.
Day’s interpretation establishing equitable powers in state securities
actions was in line with the larger federal securities regulation scheme and
considered prominent and recurring themes of securities regulation:
efficiency and enforcement capabilities. Indeed, the Blair court subsequently
recognized the State ex rel. Day decision as “consistent with federal courts’

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

617 P.2d 1334 (Okla. 1980).
Id. at 1335.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1336 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)).
12 OKLA. STAT. § 10 (1971) (repealed 1984).
OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 7(a).
State ex rel. Day, 617 P.2d at 1338 (emphasis added).
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construction of the purpose of federal securities laws to divest a wrongdoer of
ill-gotten gains by the equitable remedy of disgorgement.”71
Besides the Department of Securities having the opportunity to maintain a
clawback claim, the court-appointed receiver similarly has such an ability. In
Oklahoma, although statute governs the appointment of a receiver, “in
deciding questions arising under this head, the court must look for guidance
to the established usages and customs heretofore prevailing in the courts of
equity.”72 The issues that arise during the term of the receiver will thus be
governed not by explicit statute but through the over-arching principles of
equity.73 Because a receiver “steps into the shoes” of the defunct enterprise, a
plaintiff-receiver may only bring suit to address the injuries to the actual
entity in receivership—in this case, the defunct Ponzi estate.74
The final element of the Oklahoma equity puzzle rests in the
characterization of unjust enrichment. The equitable theory of unjust
enrichment provides a basis for remedies through the essential principles of
equity, justice, and good conscience.75 In Oklahoma, unjust enrichment is
specifically defined as:
[a] right of recovery . . . [that] is essentially equitable, its basis
being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good
conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the
expense of another ... [It] arises not only where an expenditure by
one person adds to the property of another, but also where the
expenditure saves the other from expense or loss.76
The controversy that the courts must subsequently resolve, however, is
how to reconcile these central tenants of equity as established in Oklahoma
with the fact that a particular clawback will result in a seemingly inequitable
result for at least one of the parties to the Ponzi scheme.

71. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 653 (Okla. 2010).
72. Ward v. Inter-Ocean Oil & Gas Co., 153 P. 115, 116 (Okla. 1915).
73. See Smoot v. Barker, 153 P.2d 227, 228 (Okla. 1944).
74. See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995).
75. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 9 (2011).
76. N.C. Corff P’ship v. OXY USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992)
(quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (1973)). Unjust enrichment
can generally be identified where there is “[a] benefit obtained from another, not intended as
a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or
recompense.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1678 (9th ed. 2009).
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B. Divergent Clawback Approaches (but Predictable Results)
Although the Oklahoma court concluded that the unjust enrichment theory
may stand as the basis for the clawback effort, there is little evidence of a
consensus among the courts on this particular issue. Indeed, where courts
have allowed an equitable theory to serve as the foundation for a clawback
claim, there has been no mention of limiting such clawback in terms of
reasonableness.
Within the Tenth Circuit, for example, the trial court in Johnson v.
Studholme77 declined the receiver’s suit to utilize an unjust enrichment claim
after the downfall of a Ponzi scheme,78 focusing its analysis on what the
receiver did not allege—that those winning investors in any way knew about
or participated in the fraud.79 Instead, the investors simply received the
returns that they were promised,80 and such investors were “purchasers for
value” through their initial risky investments.81 Ultimately the court held that
the receiver, in attempting to meet the burdens of unjust enrichment as to the
investors, did not present an instance where it would be inequitable for the
defendants to keep the payments—one of the elements in satisfying an unjust
enrichment cause of action.82 Johnson stands for the proposition that Ponzi
funds represent a zero sum game: either the funds representing profit serve to
unjustly enrich an investor or they do not.
However, as there is no clear-cut fault by the winning investors in a Ponzi
scheme, the courts continue struggling to find a balance when both winning
and losing innocent investors are caught in the crosshairs. For example, the
court in Chosnek v. Rolley83 found that Ponzi investors are not unjustly
enriched “so long as the returns do not exceed the amount of the original
investment.”84 Whether or not the investor “broke-even” is the measuring
point here. In Chosnek, a losing investor of a Ponzi scheme brought an
unjust enrichment claim against a certain group of winning investors in
conjunction with the court-appointed receiver.85 The Indiana court focused
on the fact that the winning investors received their profits in good faith

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

619 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1350.
688 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
Id. at 204.
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while unaware of the underlying scam.86 However, the ultimate holding is
not an absolute bar to a clawback effort: “[t]o the extent of the original
investment, such [returns] are not subject to claims made by later investors on
the theory of unjust enrichment.”87 Thus an investor’s original investment
will avoid an unjust enrichment claim but the profits may not.
Successful clawbacks under a UFTA theory similarly present a uniform
practice regarding the amount available for disgorgement: once the profits
are classified as fraudulent under the UFTA, they are all fraudulent regardless
of whether they happened to fall into the hands of an innocent investor. This
perspective is accepted because of the illicit nature of a Ponzi scheme. Due
to the commingling of funds, shoddy record keeping, and outright lies, it
would prove tremendously difficult, if not impossible, to trace specific funds
to affirm or disprove their origin. In Donell v. Kowell,88 for example, the
court not only noted the “largely uniform practice” of applying the UFTA to
Ponzi-scheme related proceedings,89 but also that the UFTA applies to those
innocent investors who made a profit.90 The simple, general rule remains that
“to the extent innocent investors have received payments in excess of the
amounts of principal that they originally invested, those payments are
avoidable as fraudulent transfers.”91 The concept of equity arises even
through this statutory analysis as the court finds it “more equitable to attempt
to distribute all recoverable assets among the defrauded investors who did
not recover their initial investments rather than to allow the losses to rest
where they fell.”92
C. The Outcome: Pro Rata Distribution and an Attempt to Make Defrauded
Investors Whole
Once the receiver successfully claws back the profits from the scheme, a
pro rata distribution system is widely accepted as the most equitable method
to treat creditors of the estate. Tracing, which is not a remedy but a tool, is a
way a particular claimant can distinguish his or her property within the estate
of the offender (in this case the Ponzi-schemer).93 Initially it would seem the
86. Id. at 210.
87. Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added).
88. 533 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 770.
90. Id. at 776.
91. Id. at 770.
92. Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
93. Claire Seaton Rosa, Should Owners Have to Share? An Examination of Forced
Sharing in the Name of Fairness in Recent Multiple Fraud Victim Cases, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1331, 1336 (2010).
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best place to start to redistribute the funds would be through directly tracing
the funds; however, the facts of the administration of a Ponzi scheme
interfere and provide an insurmountable roadblock. Essentially, the
commingling of funds and less-than-ideal record keeping of the scheme make
it logistically impossible to directly trace each investor’s funds. The Supreme
Court’s holding in this area in the case of Cunningham v. Brown94 was
summarized by one commentator thus:
tracing presumptions cannot be justified (and must therefore be
suspended) when the parties fighting over unidentifiable,
commingled property are all victims of the same fraud . . . . In
such a case, the money or other property is to be distributed pro
rata among those who can show their money went into the
account, but are unable to satisfy the tracing burden without the
use of presumptions.95
This rule from Cunningham means that, in practice, all the victims would
share the recovered money proportionate to their own losses.96
The Oklahoma case of Adams v. Moriarty97 similarly held that more recent
investors of a Ponzi scheme endeavor could not utilize tracing to reclaim their
newly invested money and that the Department of Securities was allowed to
move forward with a pro rata distribution scheme concerning the losing
investors.98 In 2003, James Adams deposited almost $400,000 of his
retirement savings with the Hickman Agency; only nineteen days later, the
firm was closed by the Department of Securities and Stephan Moriarty
appointed receiver.99 The Adamses eventually opposed the receiver’s
proposed plan to allocate the remaining funds from the Hickman Agency to
investors on a pro rata scheme, arguing that as the last investors with the
Hickman Agency they could trace their funds specifically.100
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ultimately rejected the Adamses’
argument, instead accepting the Department of Security’s citations of
authority that “remaining assets must be distributed to victims on a pro-rata

94. 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
95. Id. at 1349 (citing Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 13).
96. See id.
97. 127 P.3d 621 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
98. See id. at 624-25.
99. Ron Jackson, They Lost Everything: Victims of a Meeker Ponzi Scheme Are Pulling
Their Lives Back Together Three Years Later, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 23, 2007, available at
http://newsok.com/article/3131666.
100. Adams, 127 P.3d at 622.
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basis unless a particular creditor’s assets are able to be specifically traced.”101
Since evidence could not be presented that those particular funds would be
specifically traceable and distinguishable from monies deposited by other
investors, the court upheld the pro rata scheme.102 The court’s rationale
focused on the fact that if the most recent investors were allowed to claim the
entirety of their investment, the earlier investors would be left with little or no
monetary remedy.103 Such a situation would result in further inequity and an
outcome “not in accord with the rules established in similar cases.”104
In general, the “pro rata rule for Ponzi schemes” will mean that the assets
remaining from the defunct scheme will be dispersed to creditors on a pro
rata basis unless there is a rare instance where a specific claimant can
expressly trace his or her assets.105 However, the very nature of a Ponzi
scheme makes this a difficult feat, as once the funds from various investors
are commingled into one account, “those assets lose their character as the
peculiar assets of their investor.”106
IV. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair
A. Facts and Procedural History
Marsha Schubert perpetrated a Ponzi scheme that attracted more than $200
million dollars in investments from December 1999 through October 2004.107
Acting as a registered agent of the firm of Schubert and Associates, Schubert
consistently made oral statements to investors that their money would be used
in trading option accounts and in day trading accounts.108 The investors
relied on her verbal assertions that their accounts continued to hold hefty
balances.109 Schubert was, in actuality, depositing the newly “invested”
money into both her personal bank accounts and the accounts of Schubert and
Associates.110 Despite her claims to investors otherwise, Schubert never used
the monies in these accounts “to make any investment trades through the
broker-dealers on behalf of the investors.”111 Because of her verbal reports of
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
See Rosa, supra note 93, at 1350.
Id. at 1350-51.
Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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success, many of Schubert’s clients re-invested their purported profits.112
Most of the money apportioned for day trading endeavors was instead
transferred into Schubert’s personal account and commingled with her
personal funds.113 In actuality, Plaintiff subsequently alleged that less than
1% of the money deposited was ever used to invest in option contracts, and
no amount was used in day trading endeavors: in short, the only thing
Schubert did was operate a classic Ponzi scheme.114 In the end, the damage
was clear: approximately eighty-seven people lost an aggregate of over nine
million dollars while, on the flip side, over 150 people allegedly made about
six million dollars from their investments with Schubert.115
As with any Ponzi scheme, Schubert kept the scam afloat by making
payments to some of her investors at strategic times to prevent questions and
discovery of the fraud.116 After the Department of Securities received an
anonymous tip in October of 2004 and began an investigation, 117 the Ponzi
scheme came crumbling down.118 The Department of Securities immediately
began proceedings in Logan County for injunctive relief and the appointment
of a receiver.119 The court-appointed receiver proceeded with marshalling
and protecting the assets “for the benefit of claimants and creditors of
Marsh[a] Schubert and Schubert and Associates.”120 In an effort to
accomplish the task, the receiver (in a joint action with the Department of
Securities) brought suit in the District Court of Oklahoma county against 158
named defendants—those determined to have been paid a profit with funds
from the Ponzi scheme.121
The initial petition by the receiver and Department of Securities asserted
claims of unjust enrichment and fraudulent transfer and sought an equitable
lien against the real and personal property purchased by investors with funds
from the Ponzi scheme.122 The claim of fraudulent transfer was later
112. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1.
113. Blair, 231 P.3d at 650.
114. Plaintiffs’ Petition at *7, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Mathews, No. CJ2005-3796 (Okla. Cnty. Ct. May 11, 2005).
115. Blair, 231 P.3d at 650.
116. See id. One investor even explained that Schubert asked him what he thought he
should have “earned” and immediately wrote a check to the investor above that value during
a meeting in her office. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1.
117. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1.
118. Blair, 231 P.3d at 650.
119. Id.
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id.
122. Plaintiffs’ Petition, supra note 114, at *8-10.
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withdrawn, but the receiver and Department of Securities were granted a
summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim against the defendants.123
The Oklahoma Supreme Court consolidated the various appeals and issued a
single opinion.124
B. Issue and Holding
After a comprehensive review of the competing legal and equitable claims,
a divided court125 found that the Department of Securities had the ability to
bring suit against the innocent winning investors of the Ponzi scheme.126
Further, the opinion by Chief Justice James Edmonson held that the
Department and receiver could proceed with claims against winning investors
to recover the unreasonable profits surpassing their initial investments in the
scheme.127 Justice Winchester, writing for the three dissenters, found the
ultimate holdings short of satisfactory, especially the lack of guidance
regarding the court’s unreasonableness standard.128
C. Rationale of the Court
After a brief discussion of the facts of Schubert’s Ponzi scheme, the court
addressed the question of equitable action and the amount of recovery from
innocent investors in turn. First, the court noted the statutory beginnings of
the Department of Securities before proceeding with an analysis of whether
its specific action was within the bounds of powers either expressly granted
or that may be fairly implied “for the due and efficient exercise of the powers
expressly granted.”129 The analysis found a basis for the Department of
Securities to seek equitable relief.130 The appropriate relief would be
disgorgement of the profits from a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by a
Department of Security-regulated entity or requiring those holding the gains

123. Blair, 231 P.3d at 651.
124. Blair, 231 P.3d at 651.
125. Justices Edmondson, Taylor, Opala, Colbert, and Reif comprised the majority, with
Justices Hargrave, Kauger, and Winchester dissenting. Justice Watt did not participate in this
decision. Id. at 670.
126. Id. at 658.
127. Id. at 663, 665.
128. Id. at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 652 (majority opinion) (alterations omitted) (citing Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v.
Okla. Dep’t of Cent. Servs., 55 P.3d 1072, 1083-84 (Okla. 2002)).
130. See id.
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to expel those funds not in an effort to compensate the victims, “but to
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.”131
As a function of a state’s police or regulatory authority,132 the court
reasoned, disgorgement furthers the public purposes and nature of securities
law themselves when “the nature of the transaction between the Ponzi
operator and innocent investor is inequitable and the innocent investor’s right
to the funds becomes merely possessory.”133 The court implicitly adopted the
Department of Security’s argument that the defendants, or winning Ponzi
scheme investors, are nominal defendants (those that may have the funds and
should be disgorged of them, even though no culpability is alleged134) when it
held the district court had the necessary subject matter jurisdiction to rule as
to the contending ownership claims of funds collected in the course of the
Ponzi scheme.135
In terms of obtaining equitable relief from Ponzi scheme investors, the
court declined to hold that the money distributed as profit is per se
inequitable as a matter of law and must ultimately be determined by a finding
of both fact and law.136 Since an element of some wrongdoing is required to
fulfill the present Oklahoma definition of unjust enrichment,137 the court
stated it will require the Department of Securities or receiver to show that the
conduct of solely possessing profit from a Ponzi scheme on its face
constitutes “active wrongdoing or possession against equity and good
conscience sufficient to justify a constructive trust imposed by a District
Court.”138 The court reasoned that these factors together lead to the
conclusion that the profits of a Ponzi scheme “received by an innocent
investor may represent unjust enrichment when a reasonably equivalent value
has not been exchanged.”139 “Reasonably equivalent value,” a statutory term
of art, encompasses a situation wherein the Ponzi schemer’s assets are of a
lower value after a transfer to an investor,140 not where there is an equal ratio
of value “in” and value “out.”
131. Id. at 654 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
132. Id. at 655.
133. Id. at 656.
134. See id. at 657.
135. Id. at 658.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 658-59.
138. Id. at 659.
139. Id.
140. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 164. “Reasonably equivalent value,” used to
delineate constructive fraud, can be found in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and § 4 of the
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The Blair court adopted the rationale that the reasonably equivalent value
within the context of a Ponzi scheme is a question of fact141 and can be found
through examining “the discrete transaction between the debtor and the
defendant, without regard to the nature of the debtor’s overall enterprise.”142
The court argued that the acceptance of this approach aligns with an equitable
examination of particular factual circumstances of a specific case for
adjudication.143 The policy of clawing back funds from innocent investors as
a blanket principle after such monies may have been spent is troublesome to
the court, especially if only limited defenses may be available to an equitybased claim.144 Considering all of these concerns, the court declined to adopt
the Department of Security’s argument that there should be a right to
restitution notwithstanding the reasonableness of the return paid to the
investor.145 To adopt a per se rule would be contrary to equity, the court
claimed, when the investor not only relied upon the counsel of a registered
agent but also did not receive the promised artificially high rate of return on
their initial investment.146
Yet assuming that the named defendants were unjustly enriched by
unreasonably high rates of return on their initial investment as profit, the
court-created rule holds that the Department of Securities may only clawback
those profits reflective of artificially high dividends.147 What will not be
allowed is the attempt to reclaim those profits determined to have a
“reasonable interest thereon”148 as the court declined to hold that every
investor who made a profit through a Ponzi scheme is, as a matter of law,
unjustly enriched.149 Instead, in the context of a Ponzi scheme, unjust
UFTA. Id. Importantly, “[a]lmost all courts have held that a debtor does not receive
reasonably equivalent value or fair consideration for any payments made to its investors
which represent fictitious profits.” Id. at 164-65. This is because there are no legitimate
profits, or anything of value, to transfer. However, the courts that have found reasonably
equivalent value present have reasoned that the “[p]ayments up to the amount of the initial
investment are considered to be exchanged for ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ and thus not
fraudulent, because they proportionally reduce the investors' rights to restitution.” Sonn,
supra note 36, at 468.
141. Blair, 231 P.3d at 660-61.
142. Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (quoting Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.),
343 B.R. 615, 640-41 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (citations omitted)).
143. Id. at 661.
144. Id. at 662.
145. Id. at 663.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 670.
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enrichment will be found only where an “unreasonably high dividend”150 is
distributed to a winning investor.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice James Winchester recognized the
challenges in balancing the competing interests involved.151 Ultimately, the
dissent argued, the holding “leaves the district court with unsatisfactory
subjective standards to determine what profits are unreasonable.”152 Seeking
guidance from Johnson, the dissent recognized there is no “neat answer” and
that, instead, perhaps the best option would be to leave the parties as they
are.153 By implementing this standard and allowing the clawbacks to
proceed, the dissent argued, investors must now take an additional risk when
investing: a risk of “subsequent government intervention to take back the
funds.”154 Although innocent investors are involved, the dissent noted that
those individuals must assume responsibility for their own investigations and
research before investing their money. 155
V. Analysis: As the Scheme Falls, the Questions Build in Oklahoma
Clawback Litigation
If the ultimate goal of a clawback effort is to make as many creditors as
whole as possible, Blair’s new standard of unreasonableness may insert novel
problems into an already fragmented area of law and equity. Alternatively, if
the goal is to leave the parties as they stand, because they were not unjustly
enriched by Ponzi profits, Blair’s holding will similarly fail to accomplish
this objective. The court announced its standard of recovery with no
guideposts for standardization that a district court could consider, while
disregarding the possibility of a bright-line standard of recovery. While the
flexibility of an equitable approach in clawback suits against winning Ponzi
scheme investors may allow for courts to arrive at an outcome deemed fair
(to the extent possible in the situation of a failed Ponzi scheme), the standard
of unreasonableness presented in Blair may similarly produce another avenue
for similarly-situated winning investors to be treated in different fashions. In
addition, losing investors will recover less money if winning investors are
allowed to keep more. Ultimately, both state and federal jurisdictions may be
best served by the implementation of legislation specifically targeting

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fraudulent endeavors such as the Ponzi scheme and enabling the courts to
address Ponzi scheme clawbacks adequately.
A. Can a Reasonableness Standard Be Applied to an Inherently
Unreasonable Ponzi Scheme?
As the dissenting opinion observes, the standard of unreasonableness
concerning a clawback claim against a winning Ponzi scheme investor may
present problems in practice.156 Indeed the concept of reasonableness may be
ill-suited for encompassing anything related to Ponzi scheme “profits.” The
method for actually calculating what will constitute unreasonable profits
(within the broader context of an unfair, fraudulent scheme with no actual
profits of course) is left unarticulated by the court in Blair, leaving little
guidance for the lower courts in practice. From both the perspective of
winning investors concerned that they will be forced to return funds and
losing investors hoping to see the return of some of their investment, Blair’s
standard might appear as nothing more than arbitrary.
In a statutory analysis of a clawback claim through the Bankruptcy Code,
by comparison, reasonably equivalent value can be determined
simply by the extinguishment of an antecedent debt.157 This provides a builtin element for the court to analyze an amount of reasonableness by a strict

156. Id.
157. The Oklahoma court imposes the rationale presented in some federal bankruptcybased clawback proceedings, relying on the Bankruptcy Code, that if reasonably equivalent
value is exchanged in a particular transaction, it is not avoidable. See Paul Sinclair &
Brendan McPherson, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers: Part III, 29 AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Apr. 2010, at 1, 42. There are differences that must be taken into account between this
statutory approach and the equity-based case the Oklahoma court is faced with. For one, the
above-noted rationale takes into account the good faith defense presented in a statutory
analysis and focuses the “reasonable” aspect on the rate of return only, not the cumulative
“profits” standard the Blair court names. Id. at 45. Also, a strict statutory reading is devoid
of the considerations of “good conscience” that an unjust enrichment analysis demands. See
66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 9 (2011). While the federal decisions
noting a “reasonable” element exist in the context of a bankruptcy statutory analysis, some
still “detest the overreaching equitable outcome.” Sinclair & McPherson, supra note 157, at
45. The rationales of a statutory analysis cannot be superimposed onto an equity-based
claim without gaps. Ultimately, a bankruptcy proceeding “rests solely upon the application
of federal bankruptcy law and does not purport to create any equitable right of action. The
plaintiff argues that an equity receiver has the powers of a bankruptcy trustee. That adage
has some utility, but it does not mean that the substantive provisions of the bankruptcy code
are available for use in a non-bankruptcy receivership. The Bankruptcy Code is sui
generis.” Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985) (emphasis
added), aff’d 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987).
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statutory reading. However, the unreasonableness of “profit” in terms of
unjust enrichment demands a different equation when the “real world” facts
are the very basis of the claim. While a strict statutory analysis may allow for
a focus on the individualized transactions involved in the Ponzi scheme, a
focus based in equity would require explicit attention paid to the nature of the
overall enterprise.
First, current Ponzi profit is determined simply by the “netting” rule,
whereby the trustee or receiver determines if a given investor was a netwinner or a net-loser in the enterprise.158 Importantly, the receiver need not
“match-up” every investment and payment and deal with the different
players’ “characterizations of the transfers”—instead, the concern is the
difference between money in and money out.159 “[Netting] may be the only
workable rule in the typical Ponzi-scheme case, where documentation of
transfers is less than complete, payments are sporadic and not always in
accordance with the documentation of the investment, and neither the
investor nor the debtor can recall precisely what the parties intended.”160
Even this task is not simple for a receiver, but it may become even more
difficult with Oklahoma’s unreasonableness benchmark because instead of
simply determining a net winner or net loser, more information and analysis
will be required to determine whether a net winner reaped a reasonable profit
or not.
At first glance, it would appear that a comparable market analysis may be
possible given the recorded prices of securities in a given market within a
certain time-frame. Yet the Ponzi schemer doesn’t adhere to the rules of
operation that would make an analysis viable on a consistent basis. Ponzi
schemers fail to maintain precise records,161 tend to disregard laws or

158.
159.
160.
161.

McDermott, supra note 18, at 169.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Indeed,
[t]he most challenging task in a Ponzi scheme case is getting your hands around
the books and records, so you are able to trace the collection and use of the
investments to see what happened, where the money went, to whom, and what
assets may exist. Often forensic accountants are needed to do this. Many times
in these cases, there are two sets of books, or no books, or you find the books
gone when you get there, or the computer is gone, or things have been erased.
Peter A. Davidson, Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. & Ralph A. Midkiff, Recovering Lost Assets In
Ponzi Schemes: An Immediate Look at the Legal, Governmental, and Economic
Ramifications of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi Scheme of 2008, 2009 ASPATORE SPECIAL REP.
4.
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regulations, and make their living with falsities, including the promise of an
unrealistically high rate of return on an investment.162
While equity allows courts flexibility to consider factors of an individual
case and set of circumstances,163 its goals cannot be furthered if accurate facts
of the case cannot be ascertained. Where the focus is a “classic” Ponzi
scheme that preys upon the unwavering trust of one’s neighbors and the only
information exchanged between schemer and investor is vague, unconfirmed,
and riddled with lies, the facts necessary for a comparative analysis of
security prices, for example, may be nothing short of impossible.
In Blair, Marsha Schubert failed to provide standard or authentic
investment statements to her investors or any of the necessary tax
statements.164 In one instance, an investor failed to receive a notice from
Schubert for over four months165 (granted any such statement would be
fictitious as she never invested any of the money). Experts warn that
investors should always receive written confirmation as to transactions
regarding their accounts, something Schubert likewise failed to produce.166
Like Schubert, schemers may instead make only verbal reports to investors as
to what investments they made. In some extreme cases, a schemer could
feasibly never identify a particular security to an investor—hence making a
market comparison for the purposes of a “reasonableness” determination
impossible on its face.
While the court need not prescribe every factor to be examined by a
district court when determining whether or not a winning investor’s profit
was “unreasonable,” an enunciation of basic guideposts might have resulted
in more uniform treatment of winning investors. As it stands, Blair’s
162. Schubert promised returns of 30% to her investors in the scheme. Marks, supra note
1. Also to be considered is when a schemer promises a lower rate of return but consistently
delivers that return, often against common sense: “In retrospect, with more complete
information on Madoff’s investments, the alleged returns now appear to be virtually—and in
some cases, truly—impossible to achieve. Madoff informed investors that he returned an
average of 15.7% per year since January 1996.” Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 394.
Indeed as Judge Richard Posner has noted,
Only a very foolish, very naïve, very greedy, or very Machiavellian investor
would jump at a chance to obtain a return on his passive investment of 10 to 20
percent a month . . . . It should be obvious that such returns are not available to
passive investors in any known market, save from the operation of luck.
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 1995).
163. “Equity is based upon the circumstances of the particular case before the court.”
Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 661 (Okla. 2010).
164. Plaintiffs’ Petition, supra note 114, at *8.
165. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1.
166. Id.
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standard does little to assuage, and perhaps even intensifies, the fact that
winning Ponzi scheme investors “even if innocent of any fraud themselves,
are not in an equitably stronger position vis-a-vis the losing investors, and
should not be permitted to benefit at the expense of the losing investor.”167
Established guideposts for unreasonableness would direct lower courts
toward reliable information regarding the investments actually available and
what role such facts should play. As the Blair dissent cautions, the broad
conclusion of unreasonableness presents the risk of inviting appeals168—a
risk that will require more judicial and administrative time and resources.
Perhaps the court’s silence reflects the fact that, when dealing with a failed
Ponzi scheme, there is no neat or logical answer. Searching for something
“reasonable” or objective in an inherently unreasonable situation will yield
nothing. For instance, the promised rate of return presented by the schemer
to the investor would be a simple starting point. If the schemer grossly
inflated the promised rate, perhaps an investor should have been on notice
and the court could consider this an element of unreasonableness. However,
the very nature of a Ponzi scheme would presuppose that the promised rate of
return would be groundless in any financial reality, thus creating a
presumption of unreasonableness across the board. As the Department of
Securities has stated in its subsequent complaints regarding the winning
investors on remand, the parties involved “did not contract for a
commercially reasonable rate of interest.”169 The unreasonableness may
begin at the very inception of the scam. Remembering the workings of a
Ponzi scheme, all investors would be similarly situated in this regard, making
a factor like this perhaps moot when attempting to determine an unreasonable
profit.
What specific market conditions, then, could a finder of fact use and obtain
after the fact (remembering the lack of proper records and false oral promises
that often accompany a Ponzi scheme170) which would be of sufficient quality
to be the basis of a decision affecting people’s lives, perhaps years after the

167. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 403.
168. Blair, 231 P.3d at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
169. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Daniel and Crystal
Jackson, and Brief in Support at 5, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Mathews, No. CJ2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385969 (Okla. Cnty. Ct. Aug. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Daniel and Crystal Jackson] (emphasis
added).
170. See Davidson, Loewenson & Midkiff, supra note 161; see also Anatomy of a Fraud:
The Rogue Broker, supra note 1.
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“profits” are gone?171 Many would simply find none. Here it is not only a
matter of perspective, it is a matter of legal adequacy. Again, as the
Department of Securities argues, “[t]he Court should not step in to restructure
the investment agreement or contract, particularly in a situation such as this
where the speculative nature of the fictitious enterprise would prohibit the
formulation of an obvious, equitable and objective rate of return.”172
More importantly, what should a finder of fact not consider when
attempting to establish unreasonableness in a Ponzi-scheme profit? One
investor may claim his or her profit should be defined in relation to the final
profits of other investors as they all presumably bargained for inflated rates of
return. Another may clamor that the unreasonableness of his or her return
may only be satisfied by an objective, factual-based analysis of what the
actual registered securities were doing in the time frame the schemer claimed
to be investing. Yet again, the ability to locate objective, accurate
information seems a monumental task when truthful records are nonexistent.
For example, as the Department of Securities has argued in subsequent
filings of the Schubert clawback cases on remand, “[b]ecause options trading
and day trading are so highly speculative and dependent on the trader's luck
and skill at timing market fluctuations, it would be impossible to compare one
trader's returns to another’s in determining a reasonable investment profit.”173
Now courts must expend judicial time and resources to create a working set
of factors that may be years in the making.174
171. The Blair court recognized hardships of winning investors who are required to give
the money they thought was actual profit back to the receiver or bankruptcy trustee: “Some
investors who received ‘fictitious profits’ may have spent the money on education or other
necessities many years ago. What else in equity and good conscience should plaintiffs who
received money in good faith pursuant to an ‘investment contract’ have done?” Blair, 231
P.3d at 662 (quoting Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d,
833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987)).
172. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Daniel and Crystal
Jackson, supra note 169, at 5 (emphasis added).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. The Department has started to proceed with their clawback claims, attempting to
implement the unreasonableness standard into their analysis. However the current claims
present very high rates of return that perhaps will not require the courts to go into a more
detailed analysis of factors as may be necessary when the rates of return as to
“reasonableness” are not as obvious. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Defendants, Daniel and Crystal Jackson, supra note 169, at 5 (alleging 311% rate of return
on investment); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Kenneth and
Leslie Young, and Brief in Support at 3, 6, Mathews, No. CJ-2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385971
(alleging 61% rate of return on investment); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Defendants, K.R. and Dana Larue, and Brief in Support at 3, 6, Mathews, No. CJ-
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Other state courts that have allowed clawback suits under an unjust
enrichment theory have not taken the subsequent step the Oklahoma court did
in Blair to qualify the clawback amount via a threshold of unreasonableness.
175
Like the court in Chosnek176 that found that an innocent, winning investor
is not unjustly enriched only to the point of receiving returns upon his or her
original investment,177 Oklahoma could have adopted a more streamlined
approach.
Other federal courts that have similarly allowed unjust
enrichment-based clawbacks to proceed have kept to the standardized
approach: the amount over the initial investment that can be classified as
profit is subject to clawback178 or the presence of any funds representing an
unjust enrichment of any kind may be clawed back.179
Further, the larger policy goals of the Department of Securities and
securities enforcement agencies as a whole that the Oklahoma court
observes—to protect both the public and investors, to consider the promotion
of “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”180—are not spared by this
new clawback measure. Specifically in terms of efficiency, Ponzi scheme
receivers or the Department of Securities itself (pending the particular case)
in Oklahoma will seemingly have to go beyond the standard netting analysis
expected in other jurisdictions, costing time and resources with the realistic
possibility of not clawing back actual Ponzi profits. This may deter
litigation; however, litigation is a valuable tool for receivers to seek some
amount of recourse for losing investors (now creditors). Also, winning
investors who consider their profits reasonable may hesitate or decline to
enter into a settlement agreement with the receiver; instead, they may “roll
the dice” to see if they will be allowed to retain the money pending a
determination of unreasonableness.

2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385972 (alleging 246% rate of return on investment); Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Rod and Wanda Martin, and Brief in
Support at 3, 6, Mathews, No. CJ-2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385974 (alleging 89% rate of
return on investment).
175. Oklahoma was seemingly the first state court to implement this restriction of a Ponzi
clawback amount as a court in sitting in equity as the opinion fails to cite another such
jurisdiction that has accepted an unreasonableness profit qualification. Also, a Westlaw
search as of January 13, 2011 failed to find another state court opinion accepting this
standard in response to an equity-based claim.
176. Chosnek v. Rolley, 688 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
177. Id. at 210-11.
178. See, Hecht v. Malvern Preparatory Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d. 395, (E.D. Pa. 2010);
179. See Hays v. Adam, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1343-4 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
180. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 662-63 (Okla. 2010).
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Perhaps the Department of Securities, receiver and investors would be best
served with the status quo at this point; the simple equation wherein “[a]ll [a
winning investor] is being asked to do is to return the net profits of his
investment—the difference between what he put in at the beginning and what
he had at the end.”181 The Oklahoma standard in practice does not solve the
existing clawback dichotomy of winning investor and losing investor.
Instead, a new equation of losing investors, winning investors with
unreasonable profit, and winning investors with reasonable profits will
potentially increase the litigation and the problems of “unfairness” already
showcased in existing clawback litigation.
B. Downstream Effects: Altering the Amounts in the Ultimate Pro Rata
Distribution
If Oklahoma is to utilize an unreasonableness standard for Ponzi clawback
litigation, a subsequent pro rata distribution scheme would be inherently
skewed. From the perspective of losing investors and other creditors of the
scheme, funds that should be distributed by the receiver in the hopes of
breaking even on their initial investment may instead continue to sit with the
winning investors. As already noted, the receiver bears a huge burden to
locate and clawback these fraudulent or unjustly enriching funds. A
subsequent concern now is that the money may be located, but an
unreasonableness criteria may stand as a roadblock in distributing those funds
to losing investors.
Pro rata has generally been the method adopted to bring winning and
losing investors and other potential creditors of the estate into some
semblance of parity.182 But the ultimate degree of parity is dependent upon
what the receiver is able to accumulate in the “pot” to distribute. Again, the
Ponzi scheme provides specific problems that have made a pro rata
distribution plan widely accepted because once-individual funds have been
commingled beyond differentiation.183 The rule established in Cunninghamthat tracing presumptions cannot be allowed when the parties are all victims
of the same fraud and the property is commingled to the point one’s funds
cannot be traced directly and thus a pro rata scheme is appropriate,184-might
not seem reconcilable with the Blair unreasonableness standard. If a receiver
cannot clawback as much money because Ponzi profit now in the hands of a

181.
182.
183.
184.

Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 403 (citation omitted).
See id. at 402.
See Rosa, supra note 93, at 1348.
See id.
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winning investor is considered reasonable, less money is available for
distribution ratably among the losing investors and other creditors.185
While tracing is technically still possible from a legal standpoint, the
practical realities of a Ponzi scheme make the ability slim.186 Because of
such a practical matter, most of the distributions will be delegated to the
accepted pro rata scheme. However the pro rata scheme will face new
problems with an unreasonableness standard—ultimately affecting how much
recovery a losing investor could see. For a simple example, assume a
receiver has a balance of $100,000 that is available to distribute to losing
Ponzi scheme investors. The claims for distribution submitted by those
losing investors to the receiver equal $1,000,000. Under this brief example
the pro rata percentage would equate to 10% (an amount that translates to 10
cents on the dollar). Now assume that the receiver’s balance increases to
$150,000. The pro rata percentage increases to 15% (or 15 cents on the
dollar) of the loss of each investor. These incremental increases might not
seem significant at first glance, but when these small amounts are
compounded (perhaps even millions of times for each dollar invested in a
scheme), the potential losses for an already losing investor add up quickly.
The Blair court strives for equity, but equity must be followed through the
entire set of Ponzi scheme consequences. For instance, in early 2010 the
Ohio federal district court in Gordon v. Dadante187 held that while a pro rata
plan would not be perfect, it was the most equitable method presented.188
That court held that the innocent investors should share equally in the
recovered, clawed-back funds because “equity demands equal treatment.”189
That principle could also be reflected through winning investors sharing
equally by all contributing to the “pot” available for distribution, rather than
some winning investors facing disgorgement and others not. Pro rata
schemes have consistently been upheld at the federal level190 for practical
185. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 164.
186. See Rosa, supra note 93, at 1349-50.
187. No. 1:05-CV-2726, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1979 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2010).
188. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at *18 (emphasis added).
190. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Byers 637 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); S.E.C. v. Drucker,
318 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 2004). It is important to note here that:
[B]ecause receivers are appointed as an exercise of equity, they are given wide
latitude in proposing distribution methods for the remaining assets. Receivers
are not limited to the requirements of the bankruptcy laws or any other
distribution method. As long as their proposal satisfies the demands of equity
and is approved as an act of the Court (within the limits of the Court's
discretion) any proposed distribution method will be considered valid and
enforceable against the objections of third parties.
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reasons as the Oklahoma court noted. When investors have lost everything,
any amount they may recover is significant (both monetarily and
psychologically). The unreasonableness standard goes beyond the immediate
winning investor—it potentially further interferes with the subsequent
treatment of losing investors and creditors.
C. Clarity Among the Confusion: The Need to Consider Ponzi-Specific
Clawback Legislation
Quite simply, neither principles of equity nor current statutory provisions
can fully encompass the maze of innocent people and transferred funds in
Ponzi schemes. While no one can technically win when the scheme fails,
courts have noticed the silence of legislatures as to the Ponzi scheme
clawbacks and recognized that current tools at their disposal have significant
shortcomings. The Blair court remarked that the Oklahoma legislature could
not only assert that the Department of Securities is authorized to seek equitybased clawbacks against winning Ponzi scheme investors but also enunciate
what would be the subsequent “rights and liabilities” of those winning and
losing Ponzi investors.191
“The remedies provided under the law are less than satisfactory since it
will be a matter of chance whether a particular innocent investor is a winning
or losing investor.”192 The statutes used in clawback litigation were not
explicitly written for such a purpose.193 Specifically, under the UFTA
problems can arise from the limited reach-back periods, as only those

Ralph S. Janvey, Commercial Fraud Task Force on a Collision Course: Ponzi Schemes,
Bankruptcy, Receiverships and Forfeitures (Am. Bankr. Inst., 21st Ann. Winter Leadership
Conf., Dec. 3, 2009), available at 120309 ABI-CLE 355 (Westlaw).
191. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 670 (Okla. 2010). In
terms of a Ponzi estate now in Bankruptcy proceedings, a recent court noted: “if Congress
did not intend such a result when the debtor was involved in a Ponzi scheme, it should so
specify in the Bankruptcy Code rather than leaving it to the courts to ignore what is clearly
value and fair consideration under the conveyance statutes.” In re Canyon Sys. Corp., 343
B.R. 615, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006).
192. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 403 (emphasis added).
193. One frustrated court explained when trying to reconcile a Ponzi scheme within the
context of the current Bankruptcy scheme:
By forcing the square peg facts of a ‘Ponzi’ scheme into the round holes of the
fraudulent conveyance statutes in order to accomplish a further reallocation and
redistribution to implement a policy of equality of distribution in the name of
equity, I believe that many courts have done a substantial injustice to those
statutes and have made policy decisions that should be made by Congress.
In re Unified Commercial Capital, 260 B.R. 343, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).

2012]

NOTES

835

transfers made during the actual enumerated period are avoidable.194 In
Oklahoma the reach back period is four years,195 as is the case with other
UFTA jurisdictions.196 Through the fraudulent conveyance laws, nothing
“require[s] every innocent investor to surrender as fraudulent transfers any
and all payments received by the investor from the scheme.”197 Thus, profits
received outside of the statutory time frame will not be subject to clawback
by the receiver and will not be part of the estate that can be distributed to
creditors and losing investors. To make up for the shortfall, some recent
scholars have suggested the implementation of contractual clawbacks.198
While the UFTA approach provides a receiver an established route199 to
pursue clawbacks, it is not a perfect fit because of the very nature of a Ponzi
scheme given that one single enterprise can run for years, if not decades.200
The UFTA presents its own line in the sand that can cause practical problems
for receivers and losing investors alike. If legislatures explicitly stated that
the jurisdiction’s fraudulent transfer statutes would not be eligible for use in
Ponzi clawback claims, reach-back time frames would not be at issue.
Conversely, a legislative body could unambiguously state that their
jurisdiction’s statutory provision is indeed available for use by an appropriate
party for a Ponzi clawback claim. Regardless of the particular point of view

194. See id.
195. Under Oklahoma’s UFTA the time limit to a proceeding is four years “after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one (1) year after the
transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.” 24
OKLA. STAT. § 121(1) (2011).
196. While the UFTA reach back period remains at four years from the transaction date,
§ 548 of the Bankruptcy Code “allows avoidance of only those transfers made within one
year prior to the petition date.” McDermott, supra note 18, at 160 n.15.
197. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 405.
198. Id. at 408-10.
199. See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the routine
application of UFTA for bankruptcy-based Ponzi scheme clawbacks and extending the
availability to receivers); Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining
standing of receiver to proceed with UFTA claim under the implied provisions of the
statute).
200. Schubert’s scheme ran from December 1999 to October 2004, for example. Okla.
Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010). If her first investor
invested in December 1999, that person would fall outside of the reach back period under
UFTA. There are disputes as to how long Bernard Madoff’s scheme actually lasted but the
scheme appears to have lasted at least two decades. Ben Levisohn, Madoff Pleads Guilty to
Ponzi Scheme, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 12, 2009, 4:05 PM ET), http://www.
businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2009/db20090312_431966.htm.
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the legislature accepts, either option would streamline and standardize the
potential litigation.
Besides problems with statutory approaches to Ponzi clawbacks, the
central tenants of equity similarly cannot fully encompass the logistical and
ethical concerns of Ponzi clawbacks. The Blair court, for instance, assumed
that winning investors are only unjustly enriched when a threshold is
crossed—not when they receive any “profit” from the scheme—even though
all of the “profits” come from the same source. The effect of the Blair
holding presents new avenues of questioning as it appears some winning
investors will be unjustly enriched from the same Ponzi fund while other
winning investors will not. Also, unjust enrichment, defined in Oklahoma as
occurring when it would be against equity to “retain a benefit which has
come at the expense of another,”201 doesn’t necessarily encompass the fact
that two innocent groups of investors must contend with each other—rather
than a culpable party. When receivers or trustees attempt to clawback the
funds among equally innocent investors, a causal disconnect can result in the
parties remaining as they are because the courts struggle to fit two groups of
“round” investors into “square” holes. Certain courts like the Tenth Circuit
in Johnson simply may fail to see how the winning investors were unjustly
enriched and deny an opportunity for further relief for losing investors.202
Similarly, the tools of equity have trouble factoring in the differing points
of view of winning investors, losing investors, and the Ponzi schemer himself
in effectuating the necessary actions of clawing back profits. Restitution, on
the one hand, is a remedy with the purpose of compensating the victims of
security frauds for their losses,203 while disgorgement is the requirement to
disgorge funds obtained from his or her violation of securities laws.204
Restitution itself “does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the
result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is
equitable to do so . . . . It must be a realistic determination based on a broad
view of the human setting involved.”205 Not surprisingly the facts of a Ponzi
scheme can spin such a notion in circles without any clear answer—someone
will ultimately have to lose in the end, and no option is more equitable than
another.

201. See N.C. Corff P’ship v. OXY USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992)
(quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (1973)).
202. 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d, 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987).
203. See Blair, 231 P.3d at 654.
204. See id. (explaining the role of disgorgement within the context of ill-gotten gains).
205. 66 AM.JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (2011).
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Alternatively, if the purpose of disgorgement “is not to compensate the
victims of the fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains,”206
again an unreasonableness standard frustrates such a purpose. The winning
investor presumptively did not set out to perpetrate a fraud nor partake in an
action for which they themselves should be punished (unless they were aware
of the scheme or otherwise involved). Essentially, disgorgement does not
solely deprive the Ponzi schemer himself, but the innocent he defrauded
along the way. If, under an unreasonableness clawback standard a winning
investor is not disgorged, however, the only people continually being
punished are the losing investors.
Because there are currently no clear or concise judicial answers or
equitable methods to address Ponzi clawbacks directly, the opportunity is ripe
for legislatures to have their say. One option would be to limit the ability of a
receiver or another entity from commencing a clawback claim against a
winning investor unless a legal finding of culpability on the part of that
investor is established. The central tension of disgorging innocent investors
of money they received in good faith could be diffused by requiring a legal
finding of culpability as a standardization of the process. Another option
would be for the legislature explicitly to adopt a caveat emptor point of view
through explicit legislation preventing the pursuit of clawbacks by a state
agency like the Department of Securities. Investing is risky business, and the
legislature may debate the merit of clawbacks effecting to restructure such
agreements after-the-fact.
The current patchwork of law and equity has created inconsistent
treatment of Ponzi scheme clawbacks.207 The Oklahoma court sought to
understand and work with the difficult facts of winning and losing investors
being equally blameless, but their starting point may lead to unintended paths
and corresponding problems. Both state and federal legislators can and
should set the tone and put potential investors on notice as to the even more
potentially risky investment they are about to make—they may be subject to
clawbacks upon the discovery of the scheme or they may find themselves in a
more lenient jurisdiction wherein they can increase their initial gamble in the
securities market. As the Blair dissent noted, “the individual must be
responsible for investigating before investing.”208 Legislators can use this
opportunity to understand the real-world impact of these clawback claims and
206. Blair, 231 P.3d at 654.
207. This appears to hold true also within the context of the Bankruptcy Code. See
Mallory A. Sullivan, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary Distribution of Assets After
Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1589, 1632-33 (2011).
208. Blair, 231 P.3d at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
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make a fact-based determination of the most efficient and equitable method
to determine what claims certain parties have.
VI. Conclusion
Ponzi scheme clawbacks will never be “fair” to all the parties concerned
because not enough money is available to go around. Winning investors,
losing investors and receivers all have different points of view regarding
clawback actions, and it would be impossible for all the parties to be satisfied
with the outcome. Oklahoma’s decision to impose an unreasonableness
standard into this already complicated set of circumstances creates confusion
and handicaps losing investors. This unreasonableness standard stands to
complicate the accepted pro rata method of distribution and increases the
need for a statutory definition of the rights of investors, creditors and
interested government agencies. For now, instead of being left with more
money as promised, Ponzi investors are simply left with more problems.
Elizabeth Blair Wozobski

